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INTRODUCTION 
In every significant area of human endeavor, the world is 
shrinking into a global vii lage. As mankind increases his capability 
to communicate and transport goods, he has stretched his qutreach 
to include the people of all nations in common pursuits. The changing 
of the empires throughout history has proven the meaninglessness of 
national boundaries, and the flourishing of shipping and trading 
has spread ideas, art, religion, sCience, and government along with 
commercial goods. 
The mercantilistic drives that grew so strong hundreds of 
years ago, in addition to acco~dating a new middle class and giving 
new reasons for exploration and conquest, uShered in a new role 
for business In the world. Today, When one hears that, '~he business 
of America is business," there is a reminder of the role that 
commercial enterprise plays in every activity that a nation and a 
people may engage in. 
The part that the United States has played in the international-
ization process clearly dates before the final break from isolation 
since the Second World War. Its entire development as a group of 
colonies is owed the quest of European Imperialism'for new markets 
and raw materials. The motivation of Manifest Oestiny that stretched 
the country from one ocean to the other would have been an empty 
dream if there had been no commercial backing of exploration and 
settlement. Wherever settlers went, so did the traders, the trappers, 
and the miners, followed closely behind by bankers and politicians. 
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GIven these conditions, then, it becomes clear Why there is 
such a need to study the role of American multinational corporations 
in the Third World. Some attempt must be made to understand the 
problems faced by underdeveloped nations, what some of their causes 
might be, what may be done to help solve them, and how AmerIcan 
enterprIse fits into the Whole picture. ThIs paper will attempt to 
do the following: arrive at some concept of what multInational 
corporations are; descrIbe some basic characteristics and problem 
areas of Third Wor~d countries; examIne the role of the multinational 
corporations in causing and solving some of these problems; assess 
the domestic and international polltical im;lications of develop-
ment; discuss some important questions of pollcy. 
Finally, it should be noted that any stUdy of thIs subject made 
by ~stern analysts must be seen In the light of the cultural 
background that establishes their vTewpolnt. The reporting and 
examination of phenomena seldom takes realistic account of the 
experience of that whIch is stUdied; our understanding of non-
western mentality is made only in the western terms with Which 
we operate. This bias is best accounted for by the acknowledgement 
of its existence. 
DEF I NIT I ONS 
Despite the interdependence of various national economies upon 
each other due to the influence of multinational corporations, it is 
possible to arrive at some working definition of such enterprises and 
the underdeveloped economies they affect so profoundly. 
-------------- ---
Multinational Corporations 
Although virtually every major developed country has a group 
of corporations whose business goes beyond the national border, 
there is a particular need to study the American enterprise. The 
American dominance of world trade has developed to the point of 
such saturation that four-fifthS of all multinationals are headed 
by American parents. I Furthermore, American dominance is shown by 
the con"trol of the corporations based on equity ownership, Which 
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is 90% American, by source of funds, 25% American, and although less 
than 1% of all employees of multinationals are American, almost 
100% of the taxes paid on the whole process goes to foreign governments, 
that is, to governments other than those of the host nations.2 
Indeed, already by the early sixties, such American giants as 
the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) had 
established themselves as corporate monsters in the international 
scene. Although American by title, ITT conducted more than eighty 
percent of its business outside the U.S. in the six,ies, leaving 
the domestic market free for AT&T, its American counterpart that is 
not attached to it in any corporate way.3 
ITT is a perfect example of how an American multinational can 
avoid the pressures of the parent government in the fields of reg-
Ulation and security. Early in the life of the corporation, it was 
agreed that ITT would not bother AT&T in the States if the latter 
would leave ITT alone in the foreign market. As the state of the art 
of communication improved, so did the monopolistic nature of this 
corporate scheme; although manageable at home with the domestic 
companies, the monopoly problem was harder to tackle with ITT, 
wh4ch used its multinationality to evade American anti~trust laws 
in buying up the for,ign competition and setting up its networks 
around the globe. 
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ITT presented another problem in the area of security during 
the Second World War. Because of ~ts pre-war ties with European 
industrialists on both sides of the Maginot Line, the then-corporate 
head Sosthenes Behn had connections of the most sensitive nature. 
ITT had interests in al I kinds of defense~related industry on both 
sides of the war, many times unknown to both the Allies and the 
Nazis. "Thus whi Ie ITT Focke-Wulfe planes were bombing Allied ships, 
and ITT lines were passing information to German submarines, ITT 
direction finders were saving other ships from torpedoes. 1I4 In Behn's 
own words during subsequent testimony to the House Commerce Committee 
on the F.C.C., "International trade and good will should not be 
stifled ~~d throttled by a bugaboo of national defense. 1I5 
The dilemna presented by the American multinational is one 
not just for Investors and managers to take responsibility $oF. 
Based on the consumers' share of the G.N.P., 2/3 of the final demand 
of the U.S. econ~ originates with the American consumer. Given 
the market sensitivity of the econ~, that puts a significant burden 
on every American as to what Is produced, how much Is produced, and 
how much it will cost. 6 If American corporations do something, it's 
because the market dictated it; if the market dictated it, it's 
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because the people asked for it. 
If there is something special about the multinational corporation 
that differentiates it from the domestic, how might one define that 
difference? "For most observers, the key to a realistic definition 
today is the purpose of corporate management in reaching extra-
national markets through cross-border organizational structures and 
decision processes. This essentially subjective attitude ean be 
on I y pat i a II y measured object i ve I y ••• " 7 There in Ii es an i 1'f1)0rt ant 
question: how much does one rely on objectivity in defining the 
nature of the multinational corporation? Jack Behrman combines the 
subjective "attitudinal" approach with a statistical objectivity 
when he holds the multinational enterprise to refer to " ••• companies 
having sufficient alternatives in their operationa abroad to require 
a 'multinational' mentality on the part of management --- which begins 
to arise with 10 per cent of operations abroad; and by the time 25 
pwr cent is foreign, the former 'domestic-international' division is 
on the way out in favot of a world-wIde concept. IIB 
Richard Eels, after a discussion of Behrman and others, 
arrives at the following: liThe multinational corporation is a cross-
border or trahsnational business organization or aggregate of organ-
izations that is characterized maInly by the dispeTsal of its managerial 
centers among several nations for the purpose of overcoming the barriers 
at the political frontiers of states.,,9 Berhman affirms the basic 
characteristics of common ownership responsive to a common management 
strategylO leading to II ••• the emergence of the strategic view that 
business should find the best markets, employ the best technology, 
finance through the best channels, irrespective of geography." I I 
Thus, besides the more obvious characteristics of foreign 
ownership and management, other considerations involving subjective 
perceptions of the corporation's role must be taken into account. 
If corporate leaders themselves take a serious attitudinal approach, 
then analysis of their role should not be done in the vaccuum of 
objectivity. The recurrent allusions to the relative unimportance 
of national boundaries in the pursuit of business ventures is a 
major factor in dealing with nations of diverse cultural and 
developmental patterBs. 
The Third World 
Although corporations may not look at the world in terms of 
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politiGal entities, nations do. There are many ways one may approach 
defining the Third World of underdeveloped nations; indeed, there are 
many fl~s in the perception of the world as 8 trichotomy, for there 
are in many ways 8S many "worldS'8s there are nations, perhaps even 
more. Furthermore, essessments of different nations change as times 
go by. "'The West' itself is a shifting concept; the Russians, 
Japanese, Turks, Latin Americans, and even the Germans have found 
themselves on both..: sides of the line.,,12 
The division of the planet into three worlds takes into account 
the following: the First World of western capitalism, represented by 
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the United States, Western Europe, Canada and Japan; the Swcond 
World of the Communist block, represented by the Soviet Union, 
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Eastern Europe, and perhaps China; the Third World of underdeveloped 
nations, which is made up of al I the rest. There are some flaws with 
this breakdoWn, however. For example, China cannot reasonably be 
placed into the Second World with the S6viet Union and its block. 
Their economies are in very different stages of development, and their 
ideologies are different in many respects. Also, it is diificult to 
place a country such as India, which is aligned somewhat to both 
the First and Second Worlds in terms of foreign affairs and growth 
strategy. Also, the newly-rich oi I nations should be put into a 
class by themselves, apart from the rest of the underdeveloped world. 
These inadequacies lead one, then, to the question, "How many 
worlds?" Maoist doctrine categorizes countries by their progression 
toward a Marxist society. Thus, for Mao, the three worlds are 
those of the feudal, capitalist, and sociali~ommunist states. 
Although this view is gaining wi~er acceptance in the U.S., there 
are many assumptions about Marxist ideology that need to be accepted 
before one can continue in this line of analysis. Thus, for magy, 
the Maoist approach is just one among several. 13 
Professor Chu Yuan'Cheng of Bal I State quips about a IIshowdown 
approach" where the worlds are divided according to Whose side every-
14 body is on in the event of war. Other autllors divide the globe 
into as many as seven or eight worlds, depending on their criteria 
and models of development. In light of all these choices, then, I 
will adhere to the traditional trichotomy for the purposes of this 
thesis. As we will see, there are many characteristics of the Third 
World that are common to most countries outside of the traditional 
North AmerIcan, European, and Asian East~est group. 
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Just as in defining the multinational corporation, there are 
subjective and objective traits to consider in defining the Third 
World. Wi I II am C. Blanchfield says,!'1'We shall define underdeveloped 
countties in economic terms, Which means that we shall use the national 
product per capita as a measure of the economic status of different 
countries.,,15 However, G.N.P./capita is just one of many standards 
used in judging the strength of an economy, and it's grounded in 
a heavy capitalist bias. Indeed, because of the special nature 
of developing economies, many statistical assessments lack adequate 
validity due to their lack of a reliable comparison basis. "In the 
developing countries, statistical series are constantly being changed 
as to their bases or composition, and no one year's data can be counted 
as relfable.,,16 Thus, the subjective and objective are combined to 
describe underdeveloped countries. Some of these basic characteristics 
can be seen by examining their agriculture, population, G.N.P. (income) 
per capita, and income distribution. 
One of the traits of indusrtrialization in the United States and 
Europe was the flight to the cities of millions of former farmers. 
Likewise, the development of economies in other parts of the world 
is characterized by greater percentages of workers in the industrial, 
as opppsed to agricultural sec~0r. "One of the obvious characteristics 
of underdeveloped countries is the high proportion of the population 
engaged in agriculture. In the United States, less than four percent 
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of our population is engaged in producing food in order to ffed the 
other ninety-six percent. In India, however, seventy percent if its 
population Is engaged in agriculture.,,17 The high proportion of 
agriculture workers leads partly to a gap in the technological 
capabilities of developing nations. The U.S., U.S.S.R., Japan, 
West Germany, France, and Great Btitain employ 70 percent of all 
the world's research and development people, spending 85 percent of the 
total global R&D budget. After accounting for the other developed 
nations l budgets, developing nations are left with 3 percent of the 
world1s R&D money. This discrepancy, in turn, brings about a 
"brain drain" of the Third World1s scientists and engineers, Whtch 
make up 12 percent of the world1s technicians, from the countttes that 
need them more to the already developed economies. 18 The table below 
illustrates the labor distribution among various economies. 19 
Level of G.N.P./capita in 
1964 U.S. dollars 
Labor force $50 $1:500 $800 $2.000 
Agriculture and other 
primary industries 75.3 49.9 28.6 8.3 
Industry 4.1 20.5 30.7 40.1 
Services 20.6 29.3 39.2 51.6 
PopulatIon presents another major problem for the underdeveloped 
countrIes. Three quarters of the world1s population lives in the 
T~ird World.20 Furthermore, the highest birth rates in the world are 
in the Third World, which makes even more serious such problems as 
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providing food and health care, educating, and housing members of 
already strained economies. If the growth in the economy were commen-
surate with that of the population, then the problems posed by the 
latter would not be as seriou$. 
This situation is explained by the Malthusian concept of the 
1~level equilibrium trap_ In developing economies, the growth rate 
of income per capita is lower than that of population. This wil I 
remain so until a certain point is reached; after which population will 
stabilize and per capita income will continue to rise, resulting in 
a higher standard of living for more people. The trap, however, is in 
the tendency of population to eat up all the gains made in overall 
national income, and usually a bit more. The difficulty in reaching 
that breaking point lies in the relative weakness in the economy 
of the income-generating sectors for the majority of people combined 
with the population problem. The following graph il lustrates:21 
growth 
rate 
G.N.P./capita 
population 
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This economic problem is related to the social implications of 
attitudes towards family life in underdeveloped countries. Because 
large families are seen as economic assets, because most peeple in 
underdeveloped countries are also underedvcated in fami Iy planning 
methods, because of the status of women primarily as child-bearers, 
22 
and because of the high infant mortality rate, there is little wonder 
Why there is such turmoi I when countries such as India, which could 
end its unemployment if it could skip just one generation of chi Idren, 
embark on ambitious birth control programs.23 
Another major feature of devel~ping nations is the inequitable 
distrib(Jtion on income. Although the income per capita in developing 
nations rose at an unprecedented annual rate of 3.4 percent since 
the Second World War,24 this factor ia not indicative of an increase 
of living standard or income level for a majority of peop~e. The 
follOWing table shows the average income of workers in Colombia, 1964:25 
Rural Labor Force Urban Let> or Force 
Average Average 
annual annual 
Percent incomel Percent incomel 
of tota I worker of tota I worker 
Deci Ie income (pesos) income (pesos) 
I st 1.4 880 0.9 1,140 
2 nd 3.1 1,940 3.3 4,200 
3 rd 3.6 2,260 4.3 5,470 
4 th 3.9 2,450 5.0 6,300 
5 th 4.5 2,820 5.5 7,000 
6 th 5.5 3,450 7.0 8,910 
7 th 6.0 3,760 8.0 10,180 
8 th 8.0 5,020 11.0 14,000 
9 th 13.0 8,160 14.5 18,450 
10 th 51.0 32,000 40.5 51,530 
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Income distribution inequities are not restricted to South 
American countries, but are characteristic of underdeveloped countries 
overall. "A World Bank study of income inequality in 26 less developed 
economies, with G.N.P. per capita no higher than $300, reveals that 
the lowest 40 percent of the population received 14 percent of the 
total pretax income, the next 40 percent received 32.7 percent, and 
the top 20 percent received 53.3 percent. In half of the underdeveloped 
countries, income shares of the lowest 40 percent of the population 
averaged only 9 percent of total "retax income."26 
Income tax policies designed to redistribute the wealth 
have proven to be ineffective. Although there wi I I always be a few 
people who successfully evade the tax, if these few are those with 
al I the money, then the problem becomes an even greater burden, and 
a greater inequity occurs. For example, "1n only the two richest 
countries of the region (South Asia), Malasia and Sri Lanka, were as 
many as 2 per cent of households liable to income tax; elsewhere the 
proportion was less than one percent. And the tax was largely ineffec-
tive as a result of avoidance and evasion. 1I27 
There are other characterIstics that define Third World nations, 
such as their colonial pasts and traditional societies, but are not 
particularly relevant to the discussion here. The traits they exhibit 
in agriculture, population tendencies, and per capIta income and its 
distribution, are those particularly suited to be considered in the 
light of the role of American multinational corporations; this is not 
to take this role out of context, but to make a distinction. 
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THE ECOtroMlCS OF DEVELOPMENT 
As in any economy, there are many problem areas in the develop-
ment of the Third World. There are, however, three areas of concern 
especially dependent on the attitudes and policies generated in the 
board r()oms of corporations around the world. These areas are run 
almost entirely by business; they are the investment, import-export, 
and employment sectors. Corporations decide the sources, goals, and 
returns of investments made by both ppivate and public entities; it 
is through them that al I cross-boundary trade flows; they are the 
decision makers when it comes to hiring and firing practices with 
employees of al I sorts, deciding who wi I I work, how many wi II do 
it, and where they will do it. The investment, import-export, and 
unemplovment problems are not merely characteristic of lhird World 
economies, they are directly related to multinational corporate policy 
making. 28 
Investment 
If investments in American corporations abroad were made pri-
mari Iy by Americans themselves, then perhaps there would be greater 
justification for the flow of profits to the parent economy. However, 
" ••• subsidiaries of U.S. parents in less developed countries have 
drawn three or four times as much capital from non-U.S. sounces as from 
U.S. sources in connection with the financing of their operations • .,29 
As much as 85 percent of investment capital Tn the Third World comes 
from domestic savtng. 30 
Furthermore, the amount of aid given through public entities is 
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more significant than private investment. The World Bank reported 
that in 1973, a total of $13 bil lion was given in aid, whereas the 
total of direct private investment amounted to $2.5 bil lion a year.31 
The increasing role of aid programs in providing capital for develop-
ment is made evident by the provisional approval for the World Bank 
to double its capital base from $40 bil lion to $80 billion. 32 This 
heavy investment of non-American capital in essentially American-
inspired economies brings about a capital balance situation that wil I 
be dealt with later in a discussion of import-export areas. 
In regards to the nevertheless substantial American investment 
abroad, there has been controversy among Americans as to the effects 
of this investment on the Amerivan parent economy. Although it is 
generally felt that damage is done to the balance of payments and to 
the local labor force (witness the "Buy American!U bumper-sticker 
proliferation), there is not much evidence to support such claims. 
"In balance-of-payment terms, the best measutements that have so far 
been developed support none of the extreme propositions that are 
commonly advanced with regard to multinational enterprises. They 
support neither the view that direct foreign investment is hurtful 
to the U.S. balance of payments, nor the conflicting view that such 
investment is hurtful to the balance of payments of host countries. u33 
although it affects them in different ways. 
Nevertheless, controls have been placed by the American govern-
ment on foreign investment in ignorance of their effects. "Since 
1965, the U.S. government has imposed first vOluntary and then 
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mandatory controls over capital expenditures avroad. These controls 
were applied partly in ignorance of their effect on international 
payments, which was due in turn to the lack of adequate data on the 
specific operations of international business.,,34 In light of recent 
agitation for more stringent controls, " ••• the effects of such import 
restrictions and related prohibitions would then have to be measured 
in terms of the usual variables with which trade theorists are 
familiar": in terms of higher prices and reduced living standards in 
the United States and elsewhere. Conceivably, there might be some 
short-term gain for some unskil led and middle-ski II workers of the 
U.S. labor force. But the I iving standards and opportunities for 
their children would almost certainly be reduced. 1135 
Compared with the impact 6~ foreign direct investment on the 
parent nation, the reaction in host nations has been varied. The 
attitudes of foreigners to investment in their countries depend. In 
great part on their ability and willingness to use the new capital 
wisely. 'While low capital is characteristic of an underdeveloped 
country, it is much too simplistic to believe that the infusion of 
large amounts of capital wi II automatical Iy result in a higher per 
capita product. What is necessary, in addition to large infusions of 
capital, is a predisposition by the people to accept and be able to 
use such capital in producing their products.,,36 
Protests by the intellectuals in many nations, especially 
Ghana, Nigeria, India, Chile, MexicG, Brazil, Malaysia, Turkey, 
Pakistan, and the Phililpines, have been strongly against foreign 
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37 investment. They see the importation of foreign capital as 
synonymous with the importation of foreign culture and dominance. 
Also, they feel a lack of control over their own economy, a reaction 
that is not unfounded due to the attitudes of corporate management that 
they alone know the wisest investment policies and due to the fact that 
most nationals have little experience in the workings of capital 
management. 
The reactions of various governments have ranged from cooperation 
with business in trying to understand the lmpd,ications of investment 
and ways of controlling its returns to granting a free reign to any 
interest that wishes to become established. In India, there is an 
investment review conmittee, which demands that a "major interest in 
ownershlpcand effective control" be in Indian hands. The Phi I lipines 
direct. investment to specific activities; Argentina pushes investment 
into national interest areas. Uruguay and Paraguay, both very under-
developed, are eager to invite foreign investment, and Pakistan, 
Turkey, and Thailand induce capital by providing guarantees for foreign 
investors. Brazil is perhaps the most open of al I economies, requiring 
the simplest of licensing procedures. African nationa, for the most 
part, are undecided in how to provide capital for development without 
losing some of the control they feel they must assert from the outset. 38 
One scheme that is gaining in popularity is for nations to 
require an orderly arrangement of divestiture into national control 
after certain lengths of time in the corporate life. '~he challenge 
to domestic interests has caused host governments to favor schemes 
-, 
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for shar"ing ownership and control in the sUbsidiaries of international 
enterprises. (These) are generally thought of as a remedy in two 
senses: they reduce the economic costs to the host country by cutting 
off the foreigner's right to perpetual rewards; and they reduce a 
source of political tensions between tbe host country and the country 
of the parent enterprise, e.g., the United States.,,40 
There is speculation whether this prearranged divestiture would 
be beneficial to host nations in the long run. Although they would 
participate more fully in the operations of the corporation, the 
latter for their part may see this as a detriment and reconsider 
making the investment. Thus, " ••• a prearranged scheme for divest-
iture would often be hurtful to host countries. It would tend to 
scare off fore;ign investors who had a long-term view of their 
investment. ,,41 "But the multinational corporations hesitate to 
invest too heavily outside the more developed nations. They fear 
expropriation, limited domestic markets, paucity of skills, un-
familiarity with the milieu, and a general economic weakness in the 
42 L.D.C.'s (less developed countries)." One can expect the dire 
consequences on host economies of an oversaturation of quiCk-return, 
"fly-by-night" investment if corporations are not given reasonable 
opportunity to profit from high cost, long term investments that will 
continue to grow and stEngthen the host economies. 
In the views of several more radical nations, the alternative 
to divestiture in attaining greater control is nationalization. 
Nationalization is not a very recent tactic, for already shortly 
19 
after the Second World War, in 1946, Peron+ of Argentina nationalized 
the giant ITT, and Arab nations were considering the same with foreign 
oi I interests. 43 In the short run, it is far easier for nations to 
exercise their territorial rights and simply assert ownership and 
control of a corporation operating on their soit; nationalization 
requires no assent from the corporation, although it is often sought 
anyway; it may uti lize the element of surprise in announcing such 
plans in order to minimize the bargaining positions of the corporation; 
realization of the ultimate goal of control and ownership by nationals 
is immediate and usual Iy irrevers~ble. 
It is doubtful whether the disruptive nature of nationalization 
is more beneficial than a more organized approach. "Nationalization 
as such contributes relatively little to economic stabi lity. As for 
redistribution (of income), here too, the various tax and welfare 
instr\Aments can accomplish much more than nationalization. 1I44 For 
the most part, European Socialist Democrat parties have given up 
nationalization as a tactic because of " ••• the realization that 
under modern conditions the control of industry, whetber for private 
or scDcial ends, is more important than ownership, •• 1145 
Yet in spite of doubts about the effectiveness and sensibility 
of nationalization, it is an active policy of many governments. It 
can be pursued in a negotiated way, or it can be a simple expropriation 
of assets, stock, etc. The difference oetween these two methods can 
be examined more or less side by side in a single country, Chile, 
where former President eduardo Frei Montalva's preference for nego-
----------,----------------------
tiation contrasted with Allende's abrupt expropriation policies. 
"Frei insisted on renegotiating an agreement with the American 
Copper companies concluded by his own government and put into effect 
only two years before, by which Chi Ie had acquired a substantial, 
though not in every case controlling, share of the ownership of the 
copper mines. He now demanded an immediate majority interest and 
the progressive acquisition by Chile of the remaining American stock • 
••• Ambassador Korry (from U.S.) was instructed to be helpful l,n 
arranging mutually satisfactory terms. 'Satisfactory' in this context 
was a relative concept, given the companies' knowledge that the 
alternative would be outright expropriation.,,46 Also, in 1969, 
Frei concluded the negotiated nationalization of the Anaconda Company,47 
and he " ••• agreed wtth ITT on a plan for gradual nationalization, 
with the government gradually buying control.,,48 
Contrast this method of gaining control with Allende's, the 
elected communist successor of Frei, who ordered on Nov. 20, 1970 
the administrative takeover of two Chi lean companies controlled by 
Northern Indiana Brass and Ralston Purina, charging that they 
" i t ti II d • d Ch·1 lean J·obs.,,49 ••• n en ona y eprlve Chilean promises to 
nationalize al I u.S. interests in banking, insurance, and other indus-
tries and Allende's requests for the alteration of constitutional 
property' guarantees to aliow easier government takeover of industry 
and mining seriously damaged the prospects for future investment of 
development capital. 
"Wi t h the Ch I i ean government's new po Ii cy of expropr i at ion 
- without compensation designed to discourage any private investment, 
••• and with default on its international debt repayments in 1971, 
the credft-worthiness of Chi Ie would have dropped drastically 
between 1970 and 1973 whatever the policy of the United States 
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was in international lending institutions.,,50 Indeed, in 1970, 
Allende promised to " ••• renege the cOl1lT1itments with the International 
Monetary Fund," and found it " ••• absolutely necessary to review, 
denounce or renounce, as befits each case, those treaties or agree-
ments which involve cOl1lT1itments limiting our sovereignty, and, in 
particular, treaties of reciprocal aSSistance, pacts of mutual aid 
or other pacts which Chile signed with the U.S.A.,,51 
American interests should be prepared to deal with such 
wavering treatment of contractual and treaty agreements. There is 
an inherent controversy about who should run the multinationals 
the corporation itself, or the host government. This problem wil I be 
treated as a political probtem later; the point here is that there 
may be tactical advantages to being liberal about attitudes towat.d 
natio~nalization. "The fact that the U.S. government withheld 
r,aliation against Peru in the dispute over nationalization of the 
International Petroleum Company Can Esso subsidiary) raised the stock 
of the U.S. government and increased receptivity toward U.S. investment 
in Latin America.,,52 As new nations struggle with the question of 
how to assert more control over their own economies through par-
ticipation in the industries and enterprises already present, 
investors and governments must proceed with caution and patience, 
lest the door to future investment opportunities be closed more 
tightly. This situation is not beneficial to any party involved: 
the host nation, the corporation, or the parent nation. 
Import-Export Sector 
The whole mercanti listic drive necessary for the development 
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of Third World economies depends on the abil ity to trade physical 
goods and technology along with capital. The transportation of goods 
from one place to another is the basic nature of importing-exporting 
enterprises; no nation can afford to extricate Itself ftom the world 
trade business, but the underdeveloped nations have a special 
dependence on healthy world trade for the survival and growth of 
their economic systems. If they seek to make any improvements at all 
in thet ways of life and standards of living, they must blend into 
the international arena and learn from those who have alreadY'itti~Bed 
what they seek. Unless a nation wishes'to remain in its primitive 
state, which is certainly its own cljoice, it cannot close itself 
to sharing in the progress already met. And the underdeveloped 
countries simply do not have the capacity to develop on their own. 
Very few nations, such as the United States, are endowed with 
the natural and human resources necessary for isolated diverse 
economic growth. The strength of other economic powers is based on 
the ability to bring to themselves that which they don't have by 
trading what they have in abundance. Such is the very nature of trade 
and barter. 
The multinational enterprise is the medium of exchange in the 
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trade market. Through them pass al I the goods so desperately needed 
by the Third World in their quest for growth; through the same media 
pass the goods that these nations hope to use as barter. The 
corporations, responding to market demands abroad, transmit the 
market disadvantages of underdeveloped nations tnto the international 
trade SE!ctor, leaving them fair game to advanced market pressures 
presented by the mature economies. 
It is in this vital sector that the multinational cotporation 
plays its most striking role. Growing economies depertd.on the fairness 
of corporate trading policies to enhance their stature in the inter-
national trading community. 'I lustrative of this is the example of 
the tobclcco industry, upon which many economies depend simply for 
survival. "Seven transnational tobacco companies control world cigaret 
output Including about 75 per cent of the non-corrmunist world's 
tobacco production and 90 percent of al I processed tobacco.,,53 
It has been projected by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development W.E.C.D.) that "The i'hird World's share of internatiJonal 
trade (excluding China) could well rise from 12 per cent at the beginning 
of the 1970's to between 18 and 22 per'''Geht by the end of the century.,,54 
This prc)ject ion is made more apparent by the fact that " ••• Western 
markets can absorb the potential volume of Third World products without 
disruptive price competition or loss of jobs ••• ,,55 If the Third World 
wil I be able to participate more in the trading sectors, what wil I be 
the nature of their exports? What wil I be the nature of their imports 
and the effects they wil I have on their economies? 
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Pr'edominantly, the nature of Third World Exports is raw materials, 
and it is likely that this trend wil I continue. Furthermore, the 
types of raw materials they wil I be able to export are usually not 
very diverse, due fo large part to the sma I ler average size of develop-
ing countries and thus their lack of geological variety. The table 
below lists the top thirty countries dependent on single exports: 56 
country 
Kuwait 
Saud i Ar"ab i a 
Libya 
Zambia 
Mauritania 
The Gambia 
Iraq 
Mauritius 
Venezue[,a 
Iran 
Surinam 
Burundi 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Vietnam 
Chi Ie 
Yemen 
Chad 
Ghana 
Zaire 
Jamaica 
Algeria 
Sierra Leone 
Sudan 
Colombia 
Ethiopia 
Nigeria 
Uganda 
Rwanda 
Niger 
Panama 
Export 
petroleum 
petroleum 
petroleum 
copper 
iron ore 
peanut products 
petroleum 
sugar 
petroleum 
petroleum 
aluminum (Bauxite 
coffee 
petroleum 
rubber 
cop pee!' 
petroleum 
cotton 
cacao 
copper 
aluminum (Bauxite 
petroleum 
diamonds 
cotton 
coffee 
coffee 
petroleum 
coffee 
coffee 
peanuts 
bananas 
Percent of value 
oe total exports 
and Alumina) 
and Alumina) 
almost 100.0 
almost 100.0 
99.5 
95.3 
95. I 
95.0 
93.7 
91.2 
90.2 
88.7 
85.0 
84.4 
77.3 
77.2 
75.8 
74.0 
70.7 
68.0 
67. I 
66.3 
66.0 
61.7 
61.3 
60.8 
59.3 
57.5 
57. I 
57.0 
56. I 
55.9 
Dependence on such a limited variety of exports makes the 
developing economies very vulnerable to economic factors far beyond 
their control. The organizing of nations into cartels is a response 
of the Third World countries that have an exceptionally high dependence 
on exceptionally few resources, turning an extremely disadvantageous 
situation into a very strong market position. Without effective 
means of combating the negative effects of such dependence on raw 
materials, developing economies leave themselves open to annihilation 
by such forces as: price fluctuations; inelastic demand; trade 
barriers; technological advancements that lead to replacements 
and substitutes for the products; and the weather. 57 
The Third World finds itself in a similar trap with its import 
situation. Because the developed nations have more to offer the 
underdeveloped nations, and because the value of the former's goods 
is greater than that of the latter's, developing nations are net 
importers. "In 1978 the Third World absorbed 20 per cent of Western 
Europe'~i manufacturing exports, 46 per cent of Japan's, and 32 per cent 
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of North America's." Overal I, developing countries buy more than 
one third of the manufactured goods of the developed countries. 59 
After manufactured goods, oil is the most important import 
for developing economies. Despite the financial successes the oil-
exporting nations have met after bolstering their cartel with higher 
prices, the rest of the underdeveloped nations that don't export oi I 
have not been able to weather the hardships created by this additional 
strain. Indeed, they seem to be in a condition that worsens itself 
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with the passage of time and each oil price hike. liThe financi*.t 
position of the non-oi I developing countries, the worst victims 
of the oil-price increase, is already much weaker than in the early 
1970's. External indebtedness of these countries has grown rapidly, 
together with increased concern about their creditworthiness. This \,.1 
will make it harder for them to borrow more to finance increased 
oil payments. ,,60 
Yet oil producing nationa are not completely exempt from 
difficult import problems, because they atil I have to purchase many 
manufactured goods made Gnly in the Aigh priced economies of developed 
nations. Said SoU Odunfa, editor of Nigeria's The Punch, "Everybody, 
especially in the Western world, talks about rising 01 I prices, but 
e 
nobody considers that thll increase in the price tf industrial goods 
far outstrips the increase in the price of oil •••• if you determine 
the price at which you wi II sell ,our products to us without 
reference to anybody, we have the right to sel I Whatever products 
we have, including oil, at Whatever price we think is economic.,,61 
With the multinationals at the 'controls for the trading of 
underdeveloped nations, What is the balance bewteen imports and 
exports? Surprisingly, there is very little balance; it is more 
like a dominance of imports into than exports from them. In spite of 
the dependence of advanced nations on raw materials and other Third 
World products, that of the latter on advanced technology is greater, 
and the prices of technology comes higher. 
liAs long as the multinational enterprise has the pGWer,. 
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difficult or improbable theugh its use may sometimes be, to dry up 
technology or export technicians or drain off capital or reduce 
production or shift profits or a~er prices or al locate export markets, 
62 there is a latent or active tension associated with its presence." 
Although the effects of cartelization are significant (O.P.E.C. 
countries' total reserve surplus of currency wi I I reach $250 bi I lion 
63 in 1980 ), the effects of dependence on the West are greater. 
EVen in the oi I industry, " ••• It has been demonstrated that the oi I 
prodwcer"s are as dependent on W_estern markets as the Western countries 
are on oii." 64 
For the Th i rd Wor I d overa I I, "Exports have fa i I ed to pay for 
imports of machinery and equipment has been financed largely by 
loans from governments and institutlons.,,65 Along with this heavy 
financing go heavy finance charges and interest, putting an even 
tighter hold 0n growing economies. Their situation is such that In 
order to export what few products they have, they must import machinery; 
in order to do that, they must import capital, for which they must 
in turn export finance charges. From 1965 - 1976, the external public 
debt of 80 developing nations increased from $37.4 bil lion to 
$66.7 bTllion, for which interest and principal payments amounted 
66 to an increase from $3.5 bil lion to $5.9 bil lion for the same period. 
So serious Is the problem of the export of capital ~n the form of 
principal payments that the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development 
67 
reports no real increase in the volume of development aid since 1971. 
The position of American multinationals in the trade sector is 
more favorable than that of the Third World nations. So much, in 
fact, that the United States exports more to developing countries 
than to the Earopean Economic Community (Common Market), Japan, and 
the Socialist countries combined. 68 During this heavy trade with 
developing nations, from 1950 - 1965, there was only one year when 
outflows from the United States were greater than inflows back to 
U.S. par-ents, leaving a net balance for the same period of a 
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$!2 bi II ion drain in the L.D.C. 's ($11 bi II ion of neW investments 
minus $23 billion of income from the L.D.C.'s).69 From their view-
point, " ••. such data do persuade some L.D.C.'s that the contribution 
of private capital amounts to less than they are paying for it.,,70 
Even in the prosperous oj I economies, the multinationals tend to 
profit more from cartelization than the cartels themselves. 
""umerolJs computations by Western and O.P.E.C. experts show that last 
year alone each ton of oi I from developing countries yielded $250 
to $260 net pcofit in Western Europe, with only $90 to $95 to the 
O.P.LC countries.,,71 
Is this expolitation? Goldthorpe says not, but that it may be 
more serious. "If It were really the case that the rich countries 
depended on the products of poor countries, for which they paid them 
an unduly low price, that would indeed be exploitation. But it fs not 
I ike that. The dependence of the rich nations on sbppl ies from the 
poor is actually very slight. The poor countries' actual difficulty, 
indeed, is quite the reverse --- and much more intractable. It is 
that of marketing their goods at al I in the rich countries, of securing 
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outlets for their products, and of holding down their prices in 
highly competitive mar~ets.1I72 Whether the lot of the Third World in 
international trade is due to exploitation or simply the give-and-
take of the competitive market is a judgement to be made later. For 
now, it is enough to point out some imbalances they experience and 
the difficulty they wil I reach in trying to overcome them. 
Unemployment 
I~'hen we talk about Third World pressures putting our workers 
out of jobs, this needs to be understood in the context of 15 to 30 
per cent structural uRemployment in developing countries and what 
that means. 1I73 Unemployment is more than just a major prob;iem 
in the Third World, more than just characteristic; it is, in 
Rosemanry Right's words, IIstructural. 1I From 1948 to 1961, although the 
industrial output of the L.D.C.'s increased 7.5 percent a year, 
unemployment increased by 3.5 percent a year, accompanied by a rise 
74 i!ft;'iurbanl population of 4.6 percent a year, and there are not many 
signs of that situation improving very much. 
When we say that the unempl9yment is structural, we mean that 
there are many factors of underdeveloped economies that are inherent 
to them, and that these factors cause a perpetuation of the unemploy-
ment problem. It is a matter related closely to the other problems 
already discussed in the areas of agriculture, population, invest-
ment, and trade; indeed, It Is more than just IIclosely related,1I 
it is a res~it of. 
In previous generation, the population would take care of 
itself In the agricultural sector, putting people to work in the 
fields. Large fami lies were assets because of the large work force 
they localized in small areas. If some families were too large~ 
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then, in Danwinistic terms, they simply didn't make it unless others 
contributed to their survival. With the introduction of foreign 
industry and the lure of the city life, a viable option was presented 
to those families too large to be efficient on the farms. Furthermore, 
with th40l Utroduction of more modern farming techniques, even more 
people were free to find work in industry. 
The nature of the work available there, however, was not such 
that very many jobs were to be had. liThe introduction of heavy 
industry into the less developed economies does not provide much 
wage employment because of the capital-intensive nature of this indus-
try.1I75 liThe dominant fiechnology in industry is now also highly 
developed and capital-intensive; it provides work for a few highl~ 
paid workers, in contrast to the masses of unski I led workers who in 
former times dug the canals, laid the rai Iways, and hewed coal by 
hand. 1176 
The capital versus labor intensive choice is one influenced by 
investment and trade policies. Since emerging nations have such 
heavy debts to pay, they need to utilize the most efficient forms 
of development avai lable. Also, the positions of the multinationals 
is such that capital-intensive investments are the most profitable to 
make. "!~,-umerous studies have shown that by bui Iding an inherent bias 
against the potentially labor-intensive sectors of their economy 
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namely agriculture and manufactured exports --- many developing 
countries greatly damaged the prospects of their ~oor and burgeoning 
labor force.,,77 
In order to increase the employment potential of their economies, 
developing nations must improve the labor intensive sectors. It is 
estimated that by the year 2000, the Third World will need to double 
the amount of productive jobs in order to achieve ful I employment. 78 
This wil I have to come in the development of agriculture, which has 
the potential to absorb a great deal of the labor force, and in 
the development of new technology that the Third World nations them~ 
selves would be able to not o~ly use but export and sel I as wei I. 
The imperative of this is made clearer by the increasing burden put 
on an already strained economy by the masses of jobless and by the 
potential for unrest they present. 
THE POLITICS OF BUSINESS 
A$ with states of al I stages of development, and certainly as 
In the international rejations of these states, the economic problems 
of the Third World, and the social problems that accompany them or are 
brought about by them, have become political problems.as wei I. Indeed, 
the political front may be the only one over which the citizens of 
developing nations have any degree of control, unless they can find 
management positions within international corporate structures. 
Business, too, has a definite need for political organization in 
order to have more definite ideas as to What the social needs and 
areas of concern are in the economies they hope to operate two In 
addition, a strong political structure lends an air of stability to 
the economic climate of a nation, which tends to inspire confidence 
in developers that their investments might have a future. 
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The presence of multinational corporations in the Third World, 
or in any world, for that matter, has not gone without substantial 
controversy and tension. Products of multinationals have been boy-
cotted in their parent countries (e.g., Nestles, Campbel Is, and Dole), 
assets have been nationalized, property expropriated, plants picketed, 
and various other exp~essions of dissatisfaction have been communicated. 
But the multinationals are here to stay; they are too entrenched in 
the economies of developing nations, and these nations need the 
expertise, technology, and markets they provide. 
To consider the relationship between the business community and 
governments, and that of both with the people, is to consider the 
future prospects of economic and political growth and maturity. There 
are thrE!e areas that wi" be discussed here in order to gain some 
appreciation of the roles of business and government in the Third World. 
Comprising this discussion are examinations of: some"sources of tension 
brought about by the presence of multinationals in host countries; the 
role of governments of dealing with these tensions and alternatives for 
political maturity; cooperation among nations in the international 
arena and their impact on foreign affairs in general. 
Sources of Tension 
"The multinationals, after all, have succeeded primarily because 
they provide the products and jobs people want; if there is one thing 
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more alarming to a sma I I country than the presence of multinationals, 
it is their absence.,,79 Problems arise when this presence brings 
with it a strong, organized, and wei I-funded impetus in the direction 
of sets of goals that may not be congruous with those set by the 
governments charged with the establishment of national priorities. 
For instance, one of the major goals of international corporations, 
in addition to those common to al I business enterprises such as 
the generation of profit and corporate growth, is " ••• to prescribe 
policies for the increase in output per person. With such an increase 
wi II come an increase in the choi&es that peeple have."SO But it 
is precisely the areas of production and chanelling of choices that 
governments prefer to be dominant in. Thus, the relationship 
between governments and mutinationals must be cooperative, with the 
businesses conforming to the ways and decision-making precesses of 
the governments. "Both the react iefl of industry in the host country 
and that of the host government depend significantly on how wei I the 
foreign affiliate melds into the established mechanisms of business-
government relations."SI 
Ideally, then, the "should be" of pol icy-making is that business 
should conform to what is presribed by governments. International 
business is called to " ••• find a way to collaborate with host governments 
without taking over the responsibi Ilty for pol icy making."S2 
Practically, though, the "what is" of pol icy making is that 
business fol lows its own policies in light of its own particular goals 
related to making money and helping the corporation grow. If these 
policies are the same as those of the host governments, then there 
wi II be few problems. However, as is usually the case, It ••• the multi-
nationa~s are abusing their dominant positions by devices that benefit 
the company first, their parent economy second (I.e. the United States 
and Eur()pe), and only then their host economy in the Third World. 1t83 
F()r the improvement of the host economy to become a greater 
priority in policies carried out by the multinationals, they may 
have to rearrange their structures in such a way that the dominance 
of their centralized nature and the: integration of their affiliates 
is less compel ling. If enterprises in foreign countries can be seen 
not as mere cogs on a giant complex but as integral parts of growing 
economies, then an important attitudinal Change wil I have been made. 
"But both of these characteristics (centralization and integration of 
affiliates) are of the essence of the multinational enterprise. 
Therefore, What is being aSked is that the multinational enterprise 
84 be not itself but something else." 
In light of this conflict of goals, there are three basic press-
ures that, according to Behrman, governments have to deal with most 
frequently, for which a metamorphosis of corporate character may not be 
a requirement for a solution. They are: the competitive disturbances 
caused by the presence of multinationals in the domestic market; the 
increas,ed uncertainty and disruption of the economic plans and programs 
of the governments; and a loss of control over the activities by both 
I i · 85 the hos;t and parent jur sd ctlons. This categorization accounts well 
for most of the major sources of tension and wi II provide a fine 
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organizational basis for discussion. 
Among competitive disturbances in the domestic market are 
reluctance to hire nationals for top posts, a contrasting phenomenon 
of the "bratn draTn," the buying of local companies for a bargain, 
and a dr"ain on domestic investment capital due to local investment in 
the multinationals. 86 The first two problems describe disruptions in 
the competition of the labor market, Where management is control led 
by persc)nnel from parent nations, leaving I itt Ie opportunity for the 
advancement of local people within the corporate structures, and where 
the exceptionally talented nationals are exported from the economy that 
produced them into economies that may be better prepared to offer 
enticing salaries and prestigious positions. 
If a major multinational corporation comes across the opportunity 
to buy ,a loca I company that, due to a variety of circumstances, may 
not be as valuable as it may have the potential for, then it is more 
than al luring as an investment. However, this results often in 
competitive disturbances in the development of medium-sized local 
business and the maintenance of monopoly-free competition. Also, 
lhe development of local industry is retarded by the channeling of 
locally generated investment capital into multinational, as opposed to 
local enterprises, disrupting the competitive nature of the local 
investment market. 
Closely related to the issue of competitive diturbance is 
the debate over the course of development to fol low in regards to 
how evenly investment should be spread among different sectors. 
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I1A perennial issue in development economics is concerned with the 
retative merits of 'balanced growth' on the one hand and a concen-
tration on a 'leading sector' on the other.,,87 It should be pointed 
out, however, that I1leading sector l1 is synonymous with l1 unbalanced 
growth;" which is what most countries have right now. 
Another area of the economy associated with competition within 
the host nation is in the area of wages, prices, and labor relations. 
The social policies of governments in regards to wage and price 
levels, which is intimately related to the avai lability of products 
and their role in import-export policy, may not be con~ruous with 
corporate goals in the pursuit of profit and growth. "Many governments 
are attempting to maintain economic stability through policies 
directed at reducing fluctuations in prices and wages. Affiliates of 
u.s. enterprises are likely to be interested in the same objectives, 
but it is feasible for the parent to insist on the maintenance of 
lower prices and higher wages than are acceptable to domestic 
88 
companies in the same industry.1I Whereas low prices and high wages 
may tend to undercut local business, the opposite policy of low wages 
and high prices can have equally serious, though sometimes different 
consequences. 
A comparison of the position.-of governments in dealing with 
labor problems can be made with the position of the American govern-
ment in dealing with the problems it encountered with its foundling 
labor force. liAs one U.S. executive put it, 'The conditions of labor 
relations in Argentina, when I was down there six years ago, was 
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strikingly similar to that in the United States back in the thirties, 
Had I been able to see the parallels involved and to convinee our 
men in Argentina of those similarities, we would have done a much 
better job in handl ing out labor relations in that country. ,1189 
If business can become aware of the hdJstor-i~cal forces at work in 
the new economies they are developing, then many of the conflicts 
worked out with blood, violence, and domestic travail in this country 
could be more easIly overcome. 
In additon to disturbances caused by multinationals in the 
competi'tive forces of developing economies, there is a great deal of 
uncertainty cast in the plans and programs of government development 
policies. Although Gregory Grossman cites the first objective of 
political relations of corporations as being 1I ••• in harmony with society', 
objectives,"90 business may not always be aware of the wants of the 
governments in their own development schemes, nor may they always be 
wil lIng to oblige. 
"So far, multinational enterprises have been concentrated largely 
in a few industries --- in oil, mining, drugs and chemicals, machinery, 
transpo.rtat ion equipment, and food and tobacco. A feN of these i ndus-
tries, as it happens, embrace national activities in which nation-
states feel a special vulnerabi lity and insecurity ••• 1191 Governments 
are usually clear about what is expected of the muttinational and 
how it might contribute to real economic growth. "The foreigner is 
welcome only when he contributes more than mere ownership. An inflow 
of capital is not a sufficient contribution to justify ownership. 
Governments want contributions from the parents in the areas of 
management, techniques, and marketing ski I Is, including export 
opportunities.,,92 
What is required, then, is a political savvy on the part of 
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corporate management in dealing with the governments of nations they 
operate in and in assessing the overal I nature of these nations' 
political climates. "Some companies studied met unexpected trouble 
because they were unrealistic about the role of foreign governments 
in regulating the economy. Unrealistic assumptions about the political 
climate in the country in which the company is about to invest have 
been equally costly.,,93 "But the multinational enterprise is likely 
to pay little attention to national interests because it is essentially 
a non-po Ii t iea I anima I. In addi Hon, because a response to one nat iona I 
interestFan entail a conflict with that of another sountry, the company 
may not go out of its way to discover what those interests are. 1I94 
In spite of this political blindness, corporate policies 
influence government policies by altering the conditions that inspire 
them. "The entity has the power to alter the basic economic sit-
uation facing host governments and thus the power to lnf,taence their 
95 pol icies.It Indeed, in the case of Chi Ie under Allende, the power 
of the porporation in influencing conditions had great potential, 
as confirmed in conversations between Bil I Meriam of ITT and William 
Broe of the CIA, who It ••• had discussed plans for economic disruption 
96 in Chi Ie, (even though) nothing had actually been done." 
Finally, probably the greatest problem posed by the multinational 
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corporation is one of accountability and jurisdiction, closely related 
to that of " ••• the containment of economic power within its proper 
bounds. ,,97 
Even though it has been U.S. pol icy that "Transnational 
enterprises are obliged to obey local law:;and refrain from unlawful 
intervention in the domestic affairs of host countries,,,98 Raymond 
Vernon stil I cites jurisdiction conflicts as resulting in a lack of 
effective control over the activities of the multinationals by their 
99 parent 90vernments. In many cases, the lack of control by govern-
ments over corporations has led to control by the corporations over 
governments. The history pages are ful I of examples of abuses by 
corporations in meddling in the domestic affairs of nations. The 
United Fruit Company in Jamaica, Firestone in Liberia, Union Miniere 
in the Belgian Congo (Zaire), and recently the Shell/B.P. interests 
in the Nigerian-Biafran dispute all point to the dominant role 
corporations play in directly influencing political conditions. 100 
Corporations also have a significant potential role In the 
e;tectoral processes of host nations. Again, a contrast can be found 
in the case of Chile, where part of the reas0n for Frei's defeat to 
Allende is attributed to the unsatisfactory nationalization contracts 
he was able to wrestle from Kennecott Copper and Anaconda & Andes Copper 
Mining. IOI After Allende's victory, corporations attempted to assert 
again their influence on the leadership character of the nation, only 
in morE! direct ways. Reports on conversations between Wi II iam Merriam 
of ITT and the Presidential Assistant for International Economic 
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Affairs reveal him asking that " ••• everything should be done quietly 
but effectively to see that Allende does not get through the crucial 
(first) six months. II 102 After hearings on the subject of corporate 
intervention in Chi-Ie's elections, ITT president Geneen " ••• did 
clearly admit that he had on two separate occasions offered money to 
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stop Allende from coming into power ••• " 
A major factor in contributing to such corporate political 
abuse is that corporations are often under the jurisdictions of so 
many different governments that they effectively operate under the 
jurisdiction;of none. The United States is one of the most influential 
nations in forcing the'multinationals parented there to comply with 
regulations applying to domestic corporations, especially in the 
area of anti-trust. Yet many of the advantages to having such 
control are outweighed by the disadvantages encountered by corporations 
dealing with governments with different attitudes toward such issues; 
many even encourage the monopolization of certain industries, which 
puts the corporation in a position where they have to choose which 
nation's laWs they should follow. If they follow American law, then 
they risk being perceived as "instruments of American imperialism," 
and if they follow foreign law, then they are stil I American corporations 
breaking American corporate law. 
This problem is compounded when corporations have affiliates in 
more than just two countries. Just as the operations of one affiliate 
affect those of another, so do the laws of one nation affect the 
practices in another. 
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In response, perhaps even as a reflex, corporations have 
developed elements of their own type of sovereignty. Since they 
can never obey all the laws of al I the jurisdictions under Which they 
operate, they can choose which laws they wil I fol low. Naturally, 
they tend to choose the most lax, making them responsible to oAly 
the lowest common denominator of regulation. 
For example, the "nomadic mi II ionaire,1I ITT, paid less taxes 
in the year 1969-1970 than in previous years, even though its earnings 
d • d 104 B i it' tit h' th ha Increase. y us ng nnova Ive avcoun ng ec nlques, ey 
are able to transfer various aspects of their operations to different 
jurisdictions in order to avoid penalties or regulations that those 
same aspects might encounter under jurisdictions of economies that 
may be more directly affected by their operation. This makes them 
1I .•• fair!y free to al locate t~r costs, adjust thier transfer prices, 
and arrange their affairs, in order to minimize the aggregate burden 
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of national taxes. 1I 
The key to discovering the true nature of the operations of 
multinationals is access to their records. However, there are ways of 
limiting this access, as it is only one aspect, albeit an important 
one, of running a corporation. If there are jurisdictions al lowing 
for relative secrecy, then corporations wil I take advantage of the 
opportunity. "Huge sums can be shifted in and out of countries, 
profits can be turned into losses, asstes sold off, without anyone 
being the wiser. Beyong all othe~ elements of the corporation's 
sovereignty is the secrecy of its records (as important as the secrecy 
-----------------------------. 
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of the Vatican of the Queen of England), and without breaking that 
down, there is little hope of making that accountable in other ways, 
too. ,,106 (under line added) 
It must be noted that such jurisdictional conflicts can work 
to the disadvantage of the corporation ws well as to its advantage. 
There are cases of double taxation to contrast the examples of 
little or no taxation, for instance, but these are not as abundant. 
Sovernment tn the Third World 
The national governments of the Third World have a great deal 
of problems to contend with, most 6f which are of a very complicated 
nature and require elaborate solutions. Unfortunately, the levels of 
political development and maturity among Third World countries i~e 
usually not commensurate with the economic advances made by the 
importation of modern corporate techniques. "A decent respect for the 
opinions of mankind now seems to require a willingness on the part of 
sovereigns to expose many critical national policies to the collective 
scrutiny of a jury of peers.,, 107 
The imperative of this new review is more compelling than merely 
for the "decent reapect for the opinions of mankind." Myrdal states 
that " ••• the reform of governments is a necessary ingredient in the 
overal I pJan a developing country must adopt in order to effectively 
use the economic resources that it may attain." IOa In most instances, 
the cal I for greater government involvement in the affairs of the 
multinational and in correcting the problems they bring is a cal I to 
reform of crucial government structures and functions. 
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The prospects for sweeping reform are related to the positions 
of the corporation and the government relative to each other. "As 
long as most of these governments are highly dependent on their regular 
checks from the companies, it is in their interest to push the companies 
only so far. Both sides sti I I need each other, though the terms of 
the oftEm unwi Iling partnership are steadi Iy moving in favor of the 
governments."I09 The communitive properties of the corporate 
arrangements are such that the dependence on success in maintaining 
profit levels is passed from the market through the corporation to 
the government itself. If the nation could do without the corporation, 
there would be no problem with controlling it; since the nation is 
dependent on the corporation for something, and the corporation is 
dependent on profit, the nation cannot do too much to damage the 
prospects for the generation of such revenue. "The nub of the contro-
versy is whether the socially beneficial activity of business will 
or wi II not significantly reduce profits in the long run • .,IIO 
The relationship be7ween government and business follows a 
three-stage progression: during the early stage, the government 
provides special arrangements for the corporation, usually involving 
protection from competition; during the iDtermediate stage, the 
pressure for the development of a national policy begins; during the 
final stage, the national policy is implemented, providing for a more 
balanced, mature economy with greater competit~on. III Thus, the 
beginning of the relationship between government and business must be 
extremely favorable from the business' point of view, but once it is 
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rather fif'mly entrenched in the economy of its host, pressure for 
change turns more bargaining power over to the government. This 
intermediate stage is the one where we find most developing nations. 
It is with a view toward the final stage and what type of environ-
ment should characterize it that political modernization must take 
place. 
liThe terms 'pol itical modernization' and 'pol itical develop-
ment' are given widely various meanings by different authors ••• 1I1 12 
Claude E. Welch, Jr. suggests three rather encompassing character-
istics of political mOdernization: 
III. An increased centralization of power in the stat,e, coupled 
with the weakening of traditional sources of power. 
2. The differentiatton and specialization of political 
institutions. 
3. Increased popular participation in politics, and greater 
identification of individuals with the political system as a 
who le. 1I113 
With improvements made in the directions suggested here, the mature 
political state would be more able to assess the needs of the people 
and investors, mobilize organizational prowess in planning for the 
meeting of these needs, and demonstrate sufficient power to be able 
to implement its plans with some guarantee of success. 
In order to accomplish the goal of greater centralization of 
power in the state, developing nations need to reassess their 
qualifications for leadership. "The next goal of the Third World 
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political elites is to acquire status and respect.,,114 This quality 
is important from the viewpoint of the citizenry and the corporations 
alike; both need assurances about what the political climate wi I I be 
like i~1 the near (and in the case of the corp..oration, distant) future. 
"There is one characteristic of the less developed world, however, that 
it does seem safe to predict wi I I continue --- endemic political 
instability. Whatever the trend of ideology may be in the less 
developed world, uncertainty wi I I be the lot of the foreign investor.,,1 15 
If this insecurity can be eliminated, the prospects for a healthier 
and more equitable development climate wi II improve as investors pay 
for the stabi lity that they perceive as protecting their enterprises. 
There is a heavy price to pay for stabi lity. It has been 
said that the best form of g6vernment is the benevolent dictator-
ship, the only problem being finding a dictator who wi II stay 
benevolent. Stability that is imposed is not a natural state, but 
one that wil I stagnate or erupt. The imposition of martial law in 
the Philippines was a move to guarantee stability, yet those who live 
under its rule are growing tired of the climate it generates. 
"Actual government policy under martial law seems much more oriented 
toward political survival for President Marcos and a traditional form 
of development than toward social reform.,,116 The leadership that 
is necessary When there is an increase of power in the state must 
be aware of the needs of al I sectors of the economic and social 
realms they are charged with guiding. Indeed, perhaps there must 
be a demonstration of the capability of a nation in producing this 
----------------------------,-------
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high caliber of leadership before power may be entrusted to it. 
Once this leadership is established and is able to exhibit 
ctedibility in the use of power to influence actions, the next step 
necessary is the development of structures within the government to 
channel this power effectively in carrying out pol icy. "Governments 
have a dual task --- that of inducing growth, with all the imbalance 
that it sets in train, and that of restoring balance." 1 17 There 
must be a compromise between forces if these seemingly contradictory 
ends are to be met, and this compromise is the result of negotiation 
and debate in several specific policy areas. I~he potential f~nctions 
of government which affect business are the same over the free world. 
They may be divided into the functions of assistance, promotion, 
rule making, judicial processes, control, advice and planning, 
ownership and partne~ship, and protection. IIIIS 
Since the ultimate goal of the multinational is greater produc-
tivity, and that of government is better distribution, there must be 
sufficient social overhead capital to actually carry out plans and 
policies to completion. "By social overhead capital we mean the 
necessary infrastructure of education, health care, roads, transporta-
tion faci lities, and other services usually provided by governments in 
developed economies. No economy can do without them. II I 19 
In the final equation, poltical and economic systems are designed 
to serve the needs of the people; their needs and attitudes must be 
accounted for when considering possibilities for development. For a 
population not familiar with participation in a modern political state, 
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there has to be an introduction to attitudinal change which leads 
to a development of a system of values conducive to effective control 
of social, political, and economic entities. liThe more promising 
possibi Iities lie in other directions. One of them is surely the 
diminution of a sense of urgency, whether for private gain ••• or 
national economic growth; in other words, a change In~social values and 
even possibly ideology. The second and closely related direction of 
change.usf"be toward effective social control of business ••• .,I20 
"A.ttitudes have to be changed, long-standing bel iefs have to be 
adjusted to modern realities, people have to have some measure of: 
participation in their government. Economic development depends on 
popular acceptance of change.,,121 Such an attitudinal swing seems 
to have taken some effect in the oi I rich Venezuelan democracy, 
where the people calamored during the 1978 election campaign that, 
" ••• through increased oil revenues the government had the opportunity 
of solving al I Venezuela's problems but, instead, there was a national 
def I'cl t." 122 
Whether or not the direction of this change in attitude must 
be made toward an American concept of governance is a question of 
debate. i lilt appears to many that U.S. living standards my be gained 
only by adopting many aspects of the American way of life. While it 
may be possible to adopt some aspects without accepting the less endear-
ing ones, it is not certain that they are separable ••• ,,123 A crucial 
question that needs to be addressed by developed nations is whether, 
when applying restrictions for the use of development aid, they are 
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merely trying to guarantee the success of the program or in actuality 
exporting, even mandating a lifestyle and way of doing business that 
is not appropriate to the receiving nation. In establishing the 
AlliancE' for Progress in 1961, "The deal was that the United States 
would provide official aid and private investment, whi Ie the latin 
American govetnihents carried out reforms that would allow these funds 
to be used effectively." These reforms included land reform, pro-
gressive taxes, and education. 124 
For many, the dependence of further aid on the carrying out of 
reforms dictated by another government is anachronistic. "On our part, 
it behooves us little to ins~st that the underdeveloped country copy 
our own institutions of industrial capitalism as closely as possible 
when thett conditions and values are usually radically different 
from those we encountered and espoused in the nineteenth century.,,125 
On the other hand, other models of the modern political state 
may seem just as appealing as the western. From the viewpoint of the 
mUltinational enterprise, there could be a danger that the reseptiveness 
of the new system would not be as appreciable as that of a more 
capitalistic society. "As for the less developed countries, the main 
question is whether they are likely to adopt some socialist economic 
system that would grossly limit the role of the multihational enter-
prise.,,126 Already, some less developed countries such as Pakistan, 
Tunisia, and Iraq, ahve committed themselves to some sort of socialism 
whi Ie maintaining a deliberately ambiguous position on the future of 
the multinational enterprise there. 127 
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The best prospects fer the Third World in establishing themselves 
as viable polftical entities capable of dealing with their particular 
proble~ lie in the development of new forms of government altogether. 
'I () The conditions that led-to the de.elopment of m.dern capItalism are 
not the same as those encountered by developing nations today. Nor 
are their conditions more comparable to those that inspired socialism 
and communism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
The new strategy for the Third World should be " ••• aimed at national 
self-reliance and meeting national needs --- particularly the basic 
needs of the impovertshed masses. This strategy asks developing 
countries not to adopt uncritically al I that they see in the West 
and stresses the need to develop indigenous science and technology 
capabilities. 1I128 
International Relations 
The emergence as the multinational corporation as a political 
as wei I as economic entity places a great deal of responsibility into 
board rooms around the world. A factor as major as that of significant 
economic power concentrated in countries other than those of its host 
cannot be ignored in the field of relations of nation-states with each 
other. Thus, many of the problems faced by emerging nations are 
confronted by the international community of nations, posing a challenge 
to the established ways of conducting foreign relations. Kurt Waldheim 
said in 1975, liThe international syst:.n of economic and trade relations 
that was devised thirty years ago is now manifestly inadequate. The 
charge against that order in the past was that it worked weI I for the 
affluent and against the poor. It cannot now even be said that it 
works well for the affluent."I29 
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The world community cannot wait for developing nations to join 
in the affairs of sister nations; the price for withdrawal from the 
international community is high in terms of that choice's impact on 
the 'domestic economic situation. "But unless a nation is wi I ling to 
accept a low level of living dependent purely on its own natural 
resources, del inking from the world economy is unlikely to be feasible 
for any but the continental countries. Thus the case may be made for 
selective del inking, but that could entail considerable reductions 
in the standard of living. 1I130 Due to the nature of the multinational 
corporation, too, corporate leaders are not exempt from a duty of 
participation in world affairs in general. liThe transcendence of 
political frontiers by ingenious forms of transnational corporate 
organization does not, of course, free corporate executives from the 
dynamlc forces of world politics. 1I131 
Since the majority of multinational corporations are headed by 
American parents, it is important to examine the role and influence of 
American interests in the international arena through its corporations. 
Indeed, a good case can be made about the intertwining of American 
foreign policy and American corporate policy, especially as perceived 
by members of host economies. "As long as they are predominantly 
headed by U.S. firms, there is also a fear that they may be instru-
ments of U.S. polfcy.,,132 This utilization of the facilities and 
pervasiveness of the multinational for foreign policy objectives may 
.' -
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not always be overt. "Of course al I intel I igence sources, whether in 
America, Britain, or France, are tempted to use mUltinational corpor-
ations as cover for spies, and there can be little doubt that they do.,,133 
That the United States seeks to influence political situations 
abroad is no secret from the pronouncements of American policy-
makers. Kissinger assumes that prerogative when he asserts, 'Whether 
and to what extent the United States should seek to affect domestic 
developments in other countries is a complicated question, the answer 
to which depends on a variety of elements, including one's conception 
of the matlonal interest.,,134 In addition to these more creative ways 
of gaining influence abroad, such as espi,onage, simply the control of 
development aid funds and the establishment of preconditions for 
its use is example of American influence. From the standpoint of 
many recipient countries, ''The control of aid is a mere irritant.,,135 
Thus, in Chi Ie, though a recipient of more than $1 bi I lion during 
Frei's administration,136 there was a great deal of concern about 
what the communist president would do with the progress that had been 
made with al I that aid. Kissinger insists, however, that "National iz-
ation of American-owned property was not the issue," the real issue 
being the maintenance of healthy relations with a country vital to the 
relations with other nations in the hemisphere. 137 As has been discussed 
before, though, there is considerable evidence that points to the role 
of American pol icy Interests in Influencing the actions of other 
sovereign states. 
Given the U.S. interest In maintaining control over the multi-
nationals it is parent of, what is the process by which policy decisions 
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are madE!? The sources of official American attitudes toward its 
corporations abroad are difficult to trace. I~here are at least 
thirty distant policy areas affecting business overseas, plus domestic 
policies (e.g wage-price guidelines) which affect international compet-
itiveness. These thirty areas are under the jurisdiction of eight 
different agencies or departments of the government, while another ten 
or twelve agencies assert jurisdiction, depending on the issue.,,138 
Thus, it is not unusual for the position of the United States govern-
ment to be unclear in regards to the role of their multinationals; 
it is even less unusual for the multinational~ to not be able to 
locate the agency charged with the formation and carrying out of 
these pol ieTes. 
It is no surprise, then, that the corporations would want to 
bypass the mess offered by their parent government and deal directly 
with their cl ients. "Contrary to the cOlTTl1On impression, large U.S. 
control led enterprises are remarkably reluctant to invoke the support 
of the U.S. government in overcoming the obstacles created by other 
governments. Accordingly, when U.S. control led enterprises have felt 
foreign governments breathing down th'~r necks, the disposition has 
been to find some answer that did not involve ihtergovernmental threat 
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or collaboration." This involvement of the corporation with the 
host government may include just working within the agencies of 
the host, but it may also require a more direct involvement in the 
political processes of the host nation, such as in influencing 
elections p like in Chile where ITT head Geneen offered a substantial 
amount of money for the election fund of the conservative candidate 
for president, Jorge Alessandri. 140 
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The United States and other major capitalist: nations are not the 
only International powers with interests in the Third World. There is 
an appeal to communism for Third World nations in its intricate connec-
tion of the economic with the poliHcal in developing governmental 
structures and attitudes. Also, the problems that accompany the 
multinational corporations are associated not *ith factors that can 
be overcome but with a certain inherent nature of capitalism that 
makes it undesi:rable regardless of the supposed cost to the economic 
gYowth or civi I liberties of the nation. Finally, there is no 
significant middle class among Third World nations that would be 
forced to give up its prominent position after the revolution. 
"Two important Western concepts that the non-Western world has used 
against the West are nationalism with its linked principle of self-
determination, and equality, of which Communism is a variant.,,141 
When the opportunity arises for the Second World forces to 
fi II in a void left by the capitalists, it is taken ful I advantage 
of. The Soviet Union is constant Iy issuing ca lis along the "workers 
of the world, unitef" theme, and they are often the instrument of 
that unity. IlTheir (Western governments and press) indifference 
created something of a vacuum in U.N.E.S.C.O. when developing 
countries Were looking for a forum and the Soviet Union was anxious 
for a kind of solidarity with developing countries. 1I142 
More than likely, the response of the Third World to the East-
West conflict wil I be increasingly characterized by non-alignment. 
In their various economic programs, leaders of developing nations 
wi II " ••• court every nation from which we think we can borrow or 
get assistance, and we shal I do business with whomever responds to 
us.,,143 "In our battle to upgrade living standards.we don't care 
where assistance comes from --- whether it is wrapped in the Soviet 
flag or comes aboard Air Force One. Of course, we wil I use the 
rivalry if it means cheaper industrial products for us.,,144 
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Although there are at least as many instances of Soviet inter-
vention in the affairs of other nations as there are of the Americans 
doing so, like in Chi Ie where Cuba and other communist sources were 
reported to have funnelled funds and other assistance to Allende 
during his election campaign, the prospects for nations receiving 
active aid from both power blocks are not necessarily bleak. For 
example, "When Kenya became independent, the Soviet agency Tass 
instal led its entire communications network. The Kenyan Government 
said would you mind putting in a Reuters ticker, and the Russians 
found it difficult to say no. Kenya has one of the freest presses in 
Af • ,,145 rIca. 
One of the most effective media for the al leviation of some of 
the problems of developing nations, finally, is that of international 
cooperation. "In the words of Pierre Malue, the E.E.C. economic 
counse~ in Washington in 1972, 'Cooperation among governments is 
needed more than ever to avoid the excesses of the multinational 
corporations.,,,I46 In fact, examples of cooperation among nations 
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are more abundant now than ever before. This increase in the amount 
of examples of cooperation is due in large part to Third World nations 
having arrived at a definition of their needs for development. '~he 
Third World's demand for a new international order includes specific 
demands for: Preferential treatment for exports in developed country 
markets on a nonreciprocal basis; increased concessional financial 
transfers with no strings attached equal to 7 per cent of G.N.P. of 
O.E.C.D. countries; a link between the I.M.F.'s special drawing rights 
and development assistance; the writing off of past debts to creditor 
O.E.C.D. countries; an increase in participation in the decisionmaking 
process of international development and financial institutions; 
the establishment of a Conmon Fund for financing buffer stocks of 
commodities of interest to less developed countries to stabilize 
(and possibly raisel their prices; codes of conduct for multinational 
companies; the transfer of a greater share of the world's industrial 
capacity to the Third Wor I d. ,,147 
In bringing about some of these goals, several nations have 
taken initiative by organizing into groups with common problems 
for the development of common solutions designed solely for developing 
nations. "Toward the creation of new organizations and systems of 
cooperation, there has been slightly more progress. At the regional 
and subregional levels, clearinghouses, technology centers, information 
referral systems. news agency pools, trade protocols, and ~ariety of 
other arrangements have surfaced over the past five years.,,148 
African Information Ministers have agreed to establish a 
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Pan-African News Agency (PAFNA) that wil I be free of Western control 
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and influence, and over the issue of baby-bottle safety.Jamaica, 
Ghana, Papua, New Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau have cooperated in 
enacting regulation of imports of infant formula and the avai labi lity 
• 150 • f of bottles and nipples. There are, however, stl I I many areas or 
concern that have not been confronted, but developing nations are 
beginning to assert themselves more strongly, and this assertion is 
assuming a character more natural to the situations they must deal with. 
THE CHICKEN OR THE EGG? 
The whole question of What course to follow in the development 
of mature societies and in overcoming prbblems generated by the presence 
of the multinationals turns on whether economic progress must precede 
political development, or whether the growth of the economic-sector 
depends on a certain political maturity as a precondition. Economists 
and political scientists are split on this philosophical point, 
usually with each preferring the development of his studied sector as 
a precondition for that of the other. 
If Vernon is right in that " ••• that tension generated by 
foreign-owned subdidiaries is to some extent independent of What the 
subsidiary does; (and that) the overt rationalizations for the existence 
of the tension will shift as the function of the subsidiary shifts,"151 
then there must be some characteristic of the multinational that is so 
much a part of what it is, and that is so repulsive to the people 
in developing nations, that there is nothing or little that can be 
done to alleviate the problems and lessen the tensions, no matter 
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what the corporation might do. If that is the case, then it should 
pursue whatever course it may see fit in realizing its goals of the· 
maximization of profit and the growth of the corporation. 
Gregory Grossman maintains, in a similar vein, that the success 
of governments, or at least the perceived success, depends on how 
the economic situation and development is perceived. "In most of the 
hundred-odd underdeveloped countries, economic development, meaning 
primarily growth of production, often constitutes the major nat,oael 
purpose... In many of the countries, the success of their governments 
and institutions tends to be largely measured in terms of the growth 
that they produce or permit. 1I152 He maintains that since there is 
such a close relationship between economic growth and other elements 
of social reform, the former must be the precondition for the latter. 
e. 
Richard Ell takes the position that not only may poliN-cal 
stability be not as important as economic growth, but that the latter 
may be the cause of a lack of stability that could preclude effective 
political maturity. "Nor, indeed, is stability in itself any sound 
ctriterion for the degree of modernization. The revolution of modern-
ization, which goes on whether one likes it or not, may in fact usher 
in tempestuous periods for thses nations and for the world ••• ,,153 
On the other hand, the tensions associated with the presence of 
multinationals, although related to economic conditions, are made 
known by and are experienced through social conditions. It is the 
political organization,.not the economic, that is charged with the 
mandate for improvement of the human condition. Grossman holds that, 
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" ••• it would be wrong to assume that growth alone helps solve social 
"I problems. It may also be the chief cause of their appearance and 
aggravation, especially early stages of indutrialization when many of 
the old traditions, institutions, attitudes, and economic interests 
are destroyed or impaired. For this reason, economic dvela,tent,. 
especially rapid industrialization, may be resisted by various groups 
• in society ••• ,,154 For Grossman, this infusion of the human condition 
into the equation for development changes the mod~ Qperang;, cal ling 
for a diversification of motives beyong mere economic growth. 
Finally, Kissinger sees the attacking of political problems 
with economic solutions as anachronism. He points out an example 
of a polit¢cal decision taken on economic grounds in the cut-off 
of American aid to Chile prior to the commanist election victory 
and its consequences. "The cutoff of American aid was unpopular in 
Chile; it undercut the moderate element represented by Frei, it was 
exploited by the more radical anti-American wing of the governing 
party.,,155 
"Our experiences of the New Deal and the MarShal I Plan were 
not entirely relevant to promoting economic progress and nation-building 
in countrEe with no political tradition and no middle class of managers 
and administrators. We were not dealing wit~ mature economies but 
with sooieties taking the'k wrenching first steps toward modernization. 
It became apparent that nation-building depended crucially on the 
abi lity to establish political authority. Economic aid, by accelerating 
the erosion of the traditional order, often made political stabi lity 
59 
even harder to achieve.,,156 For Kissinger, a secure political 
structure provides the only means of controlling and directing the 
activities of the rest of the society, including economics. 
Taking the middle ground, Blanchfield says that development 
of each sector must happen concurrently. lilt is difficult to 
dtermine whether the economic characteristics depend on the political 
or vice-versa. It is more accurate to define them as being in a 
circular relationship; that is, each causes and affects the other.,,157 
In passing judgement, it may first be said that although 
Blanchfield's assessment is an apparent enough one that it is hard 
to challenge, it says Ifttle in the way of strategy. In de~ermining 
the course of development for underdeveloped nations, it is mot 
\~ 
enough to simply state what It; a judgement must be made, using the 
best tools available, in deciding what should be. It is already 
agreed upon what needs to be improved in regards to conditions. 
The real problem is deciding how those conditions may be improved. 
In the present state of things, I would maintain that what is 
needed most is the development of a political maturity reflected in 
the governmental institutions of developing nations. If economic 
development would alleviate some of the hardship brought about by 
the difficulties experienced by the Third World nations, the ques-
tion must be asked: Why, after hundreds of years of economic develop-
ment, is there stil I widespread unemployment and the accompanying 
starvation, disease, and discontent found among Third World nations? 
Histortcal Iy speaking, economic development has preceded 
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political modernization in almost every nation that is stJI I under-
developed today. Indeed, a majority of new nations are sti I I dealing 
with establishing any kind of lasting political tradition, whereas 
international business has had quite a chance to establish itself. 
'~he scale of industrial development has far outstripped the scale 
of political development, a discrepancy which ruthjess companies 
can easily exploit.,,158 
Finally, the root assumption of our way of life, in both the 
economic and political senses, is that people usually know what they 
want, and they should be able to get it. Under any different 
assumption, a market economy would col lapse, and democracy in any degree 
or form would never have developed. Unless we are wi I ling to depart 
from this assessment of the human condition, a change I am not ready 
to make, then the people who are most profoundly affected by the 
e.. 
course fol lowed should have the greatest infl~ce in charting that 
course; the development of stable, participatory political systems is 
the only way to achieve that goal. 
----~~-- -----
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